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RECENT CASES
"vouching in" if both courses are available. However, the possibility of
"vouching in" should still be examined in cases where the court lacks
personal jurisdiction or exercises its discretion to deny the third-party
petition.
THOMAS M. SCHNEIDER
CORPORATIONS - COMMON LAW LIABILITY OF
OUTSIDERS TO CORPORATION FOR PROFITS
GAINED BY TRADING ON INSIDE INFORMATION
Schein v. Chasen'
In November of 1969 Lum's Inc., a Florida corporation, invited mem-
bers of the securities industry to Caesar's Palace to explain the effect
of recent acquisitions on the corporation's profits. At this meeting Chasen,
president of Lum's, announced that the corporation's earning prospects
for the fiscal year ending July 31, 1970, would be approximately $1.00
per share. Two months later, upon learning that the estimate was too
optimistic, Chasen phoned Simon, an employee of the Lehman Brothers
stock brokerage firm. Simon had been helpful in raising funds from
his clients for the purchase of Caesar's Palace and in advising Lum's
on its investment attractiveness. Based on his relationship with Lum's,
Simon had requested he be informed in advance of changes confronting
the corporation. Simon reconveyed the information to investment advisors
of two mutual funds that together owned 83,000 shares of Lum's. On
January 9, 1970, prior to any public announcement of the lower projected
earnings, the mutual funds sold their shares for approximately $17.50
per share. On January 12, Lum's released the new estimates and the stock
closed at $14.00 per share that day.
Plaintiff, a shareholder of Lum's, brought a derivative suit against
Lehman Brothers, Simon, and the mutual funds2 which was filed in
the southern district of New York invoking diversity jurisdiction. The
common law theory of recovery was based on a two step analysis of
fiduciary obligations owed to a corporation. First, Diamond v. Oreamuno8
established that corporate officers, dealing in the corporation's stock,
owe the corporation a fiduciary obligation not to exploit information
acquired by virtue of their positions. Traditionally, corporate officers
were free to deal personally in the corporation's stock unless such dealing
involved a conflict of interest, the sale of control, the oppression of
1. 313 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1975).
2. Originally, suit was brought against all parties involved in the trans-
action. However, Chasen and the two investment advisors were dismissed for
lack of personal jurisdiction. The dismissals were not appealed.
3. 24 N.Y.2d 494, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 248 N.E.2d 910 (1969).
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minority stockholders, competition with the corporation, or usurpation
of corporate opportunities.4 Because Florida law was controllingu and
there were no Florida decisions on point, the plaintiff claimed that
Florida would look at other judisdictions' decisions and take note of
Diamond.
Secondly, the plaintiff contended that the fiduciary obligation of
corporate officers established in Diamond could be expanded to cover
outsiders who received and misused inside information from the officers.
The defendants could be held liable either indirectly by a common enter-
prise theory or directly as "non-technical" fiduciaries (i.e., one who be-
comes a fiduciary through the acquisition of confidential corporate in-
formation).6
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants,
concluding that the narrow holding of Diamond could not be extended
to cover the defendants.7 The Second Circuit reversed.8 The Supreme
Court vacated the appellate decision and recommended that the question
of defendants' liability be certified to the Florida Supreme Court.9 The
Florida court agreed with the district court, holding that no fiduciary
obligation could be found by which the defendants would be liable to
the corporation. The court went further and declared its unwillingness
to adopt the theory of Diamond.10
Schein presented a unique complaint which could not be remedied
4. H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS §§ 235, 239 (2d ed. 1970).
5. New York follows the, general choice of law principle that the state
of incorporation governs the existence and extent of corporate fiduciary obliga-
tions. Since Lum's was incorporated in Florida, Florida common law controlled.
6. The second circuit decision extensively discusses the liability of the
defendants as "co-venturers of the director who breaches his duty." Schein v.
Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 822 (2d Cir. 1973) (emphasis added). But the court also
intimates that the defendants could be liable as fiduciaries themselves. This
theory is introduced in the court's discussion of Quinn v. Phipps, 93 Fla. 805,
113 So. 419 (1927). It is not discernable as to whether the court meant to employ
these two separate theories of accountability or if the Quinn case injected terms
inconsistent with the circuit decision. Because both theories are discussed by
the Florida court, a separate analysis of both is included.
7. 335 F. Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
8. 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973).
9. 416 U.S. 386 (1974). Certification to the Florida Supreme Court is
explicitly provided for in Florida Appellate Rule 4.61.
A second issue was whether actual damage to the corporation must be
alleged in order to state a cause of action. The circuit court found that a
general allegation of damages was sufficient to state a cause of action under
Florida law. The Florida court stated that "actual damage to the corporation
must be alleged. . . ." 313 So. 2d at 746.
Missouri has case language to the effect that it is not necessary that the
company suffer a loss before a director can be held liable for a breach of
his fiduciary duties. It is only necessary that the fiduciary gain a profit through
his violations. See Bromschwig v. Carthage Marble & White Lime Co., 334 Mo.
319, 66 S.W.2d 889 (1933).
10. 313 So. 2d at 746. It can be argued that since the common law recovery
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under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and rule lOb-5.11
The plaintiff in Schein was neither a defrauded buyer nor seller of corpo-
rate shares as required by rule lOb-5.12 This derivative suit was brought
by shareholders for the benefit of the corporation alleging violations of
fiduciary obligations owed to it. The recovery sought would benefit the
whole community of corporate interests-shareholders, cerditors,'8 and the
entity itself,14 but not the individuals defrauded by the inside informa-
tion trading. The purpose of a derivative suit is to police the corporate
management, to protect ownership, educate officers in principles of
fiduciary responsibilities and loyalty, encourage full disclosure to stock-
holders, and discourage participation in management by persons not truly
interested in the corporation.15 Unlike rule 10b-5, the purpose is not
to protect the investing public and insure equality of information and
bargaining positions. 16
The Florida court likened the plaintiff shareholders to private at-
torneys general who are to "enforce proper behavior on the part of
corporate officials." 17 The proper domain of the derivative suit is then
implicitly limited to the corporation. Florida's interpretation of the pur-
pose and domain of the derivative suit was more narrow than that of the
Second Circuit. The Second Circuit extended the purpose of the deriva-
tive suit to the protection of the prestige and goodwill of a corporation
from insider leaks.' 8 To fully effect this protection, that court would have
extended the domain of derivative suits to third-party co-venturers.19
11. Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78()
(1970), and its implementing rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975), condemn
certain fraudulent acts in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
12. Courts have interpreted § 10 (b) as requiring that suit be brought by either
a buyer or seller who was defrauded by the transaction. This has become known
as the Birnbaum doctrine. See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461
(2d Cir. 1952). In Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,
404 U.S. 6 (1971), a corporation brought suit against individuals who had
fraudulently bought its stock. By expanding the concept of "sale," an action
was allowed under rule lOb-5 even though the corporation had not been directly
involved with the sale of its stock. The individuals had financed the buying
of the stock through a sale of the corporation's treasury bonds. After this case
it was believed that derivative actions might lie against fraudulent buyers or
sellers dealing in the corporation's stock. However, the Birnbaum doctrine was
recently revitalized by Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, -__ U.S. ..
95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975). See Evans, Securities Regulation-Standing to Sue Under
Rule lOb-5-Supreme Court Adopts Birnbaum Doctrine, 41 Mo. L. Rxv. 296 (1976).
13. H. HENN, LAw OF CoRoRAToNs § 358, at 751 (2d ed. 1970).
14. The corporation alleged that it had suffered damage in that such
breaches of fiduciary obligations tarnished its prestige and good will. 478 F.2d
at 822.
15. Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. Rav. 74, 77
(1967).
16. 1 A. BRoimERG, SEcuRIFTIS law FRAUD § 3.2 (1975); Shapiro v. Merrill
Lynch, Peirce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 235 (2d Cir. 1974).
17. 313 So. 2d at 742 (quoting Diamond).
18. 478 F.2d at 822.
19. A 1930 Missouri case stated that good will is a corporate asset protected
by the law and allowed a corporate suit to be -maintained for its protection.
3
Castleman-Zia: Castleman-Zia: Corporations--Common Law Liability of Outsiders
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
The willingness of a court to allow shareholders to sue outsiders
is thus, in part, dependent on its concept of the purpose of derivative
suits. The more expansive the view of that purpose, the greater the
willingness to hold outsiders accountable to the corporation as fiduciaries.
A second unique feature of Schein is that the defendants, unlike those
in Diamond, were outsiders who held no position of trust in the corpora-
tion. The willingness (or unwillingness) of the courts to hold the out-
siders liable to the corporation is based, in part, on a finding that the
defendants participated in a common enterprise in which Chasen breached
his fiduciary duty. The defendants could then be held accountable in-
directly to the corporation if a common enterprise is found to have
existed.20
The Second Circuit cited the Restatement (Second) of AgenCy2' for
the proposition that individuals may be held liable to the corporation
for participating in an enterprise whereby a fiduciary breaches his obliga-
tion. The requirements set out therein are: knowing participation, inten-
tionally causing or assisting in the violation, and receiving and using
confidential information.2 2 The court did not attempt to establish the
facts needed to meet the requirements. It simply stated that "it is obvious
that the sequence of events detailed in the pleadings, if proved, will
substantiate the existence of a common enterprise ... "23
The Florida Supreme Court found no common enterprise. Instead
of finding an intentional participation by the defendants, the court
discovered "unsolicited and haphazard revelation of certain informa-
tion. .... "24
A close examination of the facts tends to support the common enter-
This may indicate an expansive view of the purpose of the derivative suit in
Missouri and thus encourage holding outsiders liable to achieve such purpose.
See Southwest Pump & Machinery Co. v. Forslund, 225 Mo. App. 262, 29 S.W.2d
165 (K.C. Ct. App. 1930).
20. This presumes that the court would follow Diamond and find a fiduciary
duty to exist under these circumstances.
21. A person who, without being privileged to do so, intentionally
causes or assists an agent to violate a duty to his principal is subject to
liability to the principal.
REsTAT EENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 312 (1958). Comment c to § 312 states
further:
[a] person who, with notice that an agent is thereby violating his duty
to his principal, receives confidential information from the agent, may
be enjoined from disclosing it and required to hold profits received by
its use as a constructive trustee.
22. It appears that the circuit court loosely employed the term "common
enterprise." It did not discuss the commonly accepted prerequisites for the
existence of a common enterprise. For discussions on the accepted meaning of
the term and the resulting confusion from the court's use of the term see
H. HENN, LAw OF CORPORATrONS § 49 (2d ed. 1958); Note, Common Law Corpo-
rate Recovery for Trading on Non-Public Information, 74 COL. L. REv. 269
(1974); Note, Securities Fraud under State Common Law, 45 U. oF COL. L. REV.
519 (1974).
23. 478 F.2d at 822.
24. 313 So. 2d at 745 (quoting from the Second Circuit's dissent).
[Vol. 41
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 4 [1976], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss4/7
RECENT CASES
prise theory. Simon was fully aware of the non-public nature of the in-
formation relayed to him, yet intentionally notified the mutual funds to
save himself embarrassment from having advised them to purchase Lum's
stock. The mutual funds' investment advisors were also aware that the
information was confidential and they intentionally misused it when they
sold their entire holdings of Lum's before the news release.2 5
In addition to their respective findings as to a common enterprise,
the courts' willingness or unwillingness to hold outsiders liable to the
corporation was based on their respective interpretations of Diamond. The
Second Circuit, through its discussion of Quinn v. Phipps,26 suggested that
the defendants could be directly liable to the corporation as non-technical
fiduciaries. The court discussed the requirements of Diamond which give
rise to a fiduciary obligation and decided that they were met in Schein.
The court believed that the officers in Diamond owed a fiduciary obliga-
tion to the corporation because of their acquisition of confidential in-
formation. The acquisition of such knowledge "owned" by the corpora-
tion clothed them with a fiduciary duty not to misuse it for their own
advantage.2 7 The Florida court interpreted Diamond as requiring a "posi-
tion such as officer, director, employee or agent which would create
fiduciary obligations to Lum's,"28 and the making of a profit from the
violation of such duties. None of the defendants held positions of trust
with the corporation, and Simon and Lehman Brothers did not even profit
from the transaction 29
It is not specifically stated in Diamond what factors give rise to the
fiduciary obligation of the officers. Several statements indicate that it
was the officers' inside positions in addition to their acquisition of the
information that created the obligation. For example, the court stated
that "an agent who acquires confidential information in the course of
his employment '3 0 or "a corporate fiduciary, who is entrusted with poten-
tially valuable information, may not appropriate that asset .. "31 Diamond
does not tend to support the theory that the defendants in Schein could
become fiduciaries through acquisition of confidential information alone.8 2
25. For a full discussion of the relationship between Chasen and Simon
and the ensuing events see CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. [1973 Transfer Binder]ir 94,134 at 94,558.
26. 93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419 (1927). See note 6 supra.
27. 478 F.2d at 823.
28. 313 So. 2d at 744 (quoting from the Second Circuit's dissent).
29. Id. at 742. The court refers to profit as immediate pecuniary profit.
It does not discuss the possible non-pecuniary benefits involved such as enhanc-
ing the funds' image of the brokerage firm and reciprocal exchanges of confi-
dential information.
30. 301 N.Y.S.2d at 83; 248 N.E.2d at 914 (quoting from the Restatement)
(emphasis added).
31. 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81; 248 N.E.2d at 912 (emphasis added).
32. Other cases might lend more credence to the liability of outsiders to
the corporation. See Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949);
Ohio Oil Co. v. Sharp, 135 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1943).
No Missouri cases discuss the liability of outsiders to the corporation for
gains made from the use of inside information by a common enterprise. For
1976]
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By rejecting the Second Circuit's decision, Florida bypassed the neces-
sity of dealing with several problems presented by outsider liability. The
derivative suit allows the corporation to recover for violations of duties
owed it. The resulting damage to its reputation and goodwill is not
necessarily the same as the profits gained by the co-venturers. By auto-
matically allowing the corporation to claim this amount in damages,
the theory of recovery is blurred with that of rule lOb-58 3 and with prin-
ciples of equity (i.e., as between the parties, who has a greater right to the
money). While the recovery of profits as damages may be necessary be-
cause of the difficulty of determining the amount of actual damages in
such a case, a clear distinction should be drawn as to the theory of recovery
employed.
A second problem which must be resolved by a court contemplating
outsider liability is the apparent potential for double liability. The defend-
ants in Schein argued that if held liable to the corporation for their profit-
able trading, they would have been placed in double jeopardy because
the defrauded buyers could also have sued them. By clearly enunciating
the purposes of and interests protected by the derivative suit, this prob-
lem can be solved. Here a separate injury has resulted apart from that
incurred by the defrauded buyers. Liability is incurred because of multiple
injuries resulting from a single act. It is not based on a single injury.84
The Second Circuit failed to adequately establish the limits of out-
siders' liability to a corporation. The court discussed the requirements
that the co-venturers' assistance be intentional and knowing. However, left
unexplored was the relevancy of the remoteness of tippee to insiders,
the motive of tippee, the generality of the tip, the circumstances under
which the tip was received and the nature of the gain realized. The effect
of such factors on an outsider's liability must be set out in future de-
cisions.85
The justification for holding outsiders liable to the corporation rests
on the distinction between the interests protected by the derivative suit
and those of the federal securities law. The Florida court's analysis did
a discussion of the liability of outsiders who acted "in concert" with a fiduciary
who breached his duty see Johnson v. Duensing, 340 S.W.2d 758 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1960). The cases do represent a strong desire to hold directors and officers
to a strict degree of loyalty. See Johnson v. Duensing, 340 S.W.2d 758, 768
(K.C. Mo. App. 1960). A good argument, then, in Missouri for holding outsiders
liable would be that such would deter insider trading. This argument was
presented by the Second Circuit inSchein, 478 F.2d at 828.
33. See Note, Common Law Corporate Recovery for Trading on Non-Public
Information, 74 CoL. L. R.v. 269 (1974).
34. See Note, Securities Fraud under State Common Law, 45 U. oF COL. L.
REv. 519 (1974). Because. many courts fail to recognize this distinction, counsel
should argue in the alternative that while there is a technical possibility of
double liability, it is practically impossible in indirect, impersonal transactions.
In these types of transactions it is next to impossible for the defrauded buyer
or seller to prove causation.
35. For discussions of the factors which should be considered see 6 L, Loss,
SEcuRTIS RULATION 3563 (2d ed. 1961); Note, "Tippee" Liability Extended
to Remote Third Parties, 53 NEB. L. Rxv. 279, 285 (1974).
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